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REASON AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT-THE BURGER COURT
AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
INTRODUCTION
In 1914 the United States Supreme Court held that evidence secured in
violation of the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures would be inadmissible in federal criminal trials.' In 1961 the Court
extended this rule to state criminal prosecutions in Mapp v. Ohio.2 The
history of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule during this period and
beyond has been described as "complex and turbulent."3 Recent decisions of
the Burger Court, moreover, have foreshadowed a dramatic change in the
Court's approach to the admissibility of illegally seized evidence. This Com-
ment deals with the direction of the Court in the area of the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule.4 Attention will be given briefly to the early develop-
ment of the rule and to the approach taken by the Warren Court. The crux of
the examination that follows is an analysis of the evolution of the Burger
Court approach with particular emphasis on recent decisions that have dealt
with the question. An attempt will also be made to present some of the
avenues of action available to the present Court, and to examine several
alternatives to the rule of exclusion.
I. THE RISE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Early Development
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated. .. . " This provision is said to have arisen
out of the concern of its framers with the excesses of the British Crown during
the colonial period,6 as exemplified by the widespread use of the "obnoxious"
Writs of Assistance by officers of the Crown. These writs were characterized
by James Otis in 1761 as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty,* and the fundamental principles of law, that
ever was found in an English law book .... "1
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976).
4. This analysis will deal exclusively with the exclusionary rule in a fourth amendment
context. Exclusionary rules that have arisen from interpretation of other constitutional provisions
involve considerations not recognized by the Court in its analysis of fourth amendment problems.
The classic example of this divergence is the Court's reluctance to admit confessions that have
been unlawfully coerced. In such cases the probative value of such evidence is questioned. In
traditional fourth amendment analysis, such probative worth is usually recognized but other
factors operate to result in the exclusion of illegally seized evidence.
5. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
6. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959),
overruled on other grounds, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886).
7. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. at 481. John Adams later commented concerning Otis' attack:
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While the existence of a constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is beyond question, the Constitution is silent concerning
remedies in the event of a breach. The remedy available in the English
common law did not involve the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in
subsequent criminal proceedings. Rather, the aggrieved subject had a civil
action of trespass against those committing the improper official action.8 The
general common law rule in England and early America was that the
admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial was not affected by the means by
which it was obtained.9 This general rule was supported by the long-standing
tenet that "our legal system does not attempt to do justice incidentally and to
enforce penalties by indirect means."'10
The involvement of the fourth amendment with criminal rules of evidence
emerged well after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. In 1886 the Supreme
Court decided Boyd v. United States, I a criminal case involving a defendant
accused of fraudulently avoiding the payment of duties on imported goods. A
federal statute required the defendant to produce personal records relating to
the transactions in question under pain of automatic conviction. The Court
found this legislation to be violative of the privilege against self-incrimination
contained in the fifth amendment and declared the statute unconstitutional. 12
Although the major thrust of the Court's analysis involved the fifth amend-
ment question, attention was given in dictum to the case's fourth amendment
implications.
The Court in Boyd turned first to the English precedents and outlined the
importance of protections against invasions of property and the sanctity of
private papers. 13 Stating that the operation of the statute represented a
" '[T]hen and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great
Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.' " Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at
625.
Otis found the writs unacceptable because they were too general in nature and unlimited in
time. They also did not require probable cause and allowed anyone to exercise the power they
conferred. For an example of these early Writs of Assistance, see the appendix to Note,
Electronic Intelligence Gathering and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
44 Fordham L. Rev. 331, 352-54 (1975). An attempt to deal with the shortcomings of these writs
can be found in the more specific language of the fourth amendment: "[N]o Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized " U.S. Const. amend. IV.
8. See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765); Wilkes v.
Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
9. Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841); C. McCormick, Evidence §
165, at 365 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]; 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §
2183, at 7 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
10. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2183, at 6 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12. Id. at 638.
13. In its decision, the Boyd Court examined the reasoning in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.
St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765), and Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep.
489 (1763). Entick involved a civil action of trespass brought against messengers of the Crown
who had broken into the house of plaintiff whom they suspected of seditious libel. After a
four-hour search, many charts, pamphlets, and other documents were "carried away." 19 How.
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seizure under the fourth amendment, 14 the Court concluded that it was
"unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be
used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to
be a witness against himself."1 s
This marriage of the fourth amendment to the fifth suggested the impro-
priety of admitting illegally seized evidence in a criminal proceeding. The
Supreme Court, however, was not quick to translate this dictum into a
constitutional mandate. In fact, in Adams v. New York,1 6 the Court restated
the general rule that courts will not pause to "inquire as to the means by
which the evidence was obtained." 17 The Adams Court recognized that the
purpose of the fourth amendement was "to prevent violations of private
security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the
home .. .and to give remedy against such [abuses] when attempted," but
noted that all of the English and nearly all of the American cases had declined
to interpret this as requiring the exclusion of evidence.' 8
Ten years later the Supreme Court faced the issue again in Weeks v. United
States.19 In Weeks the criminal defendant was accused of illegally using the
mails and maintaining a lottery. Before trial the defendant filed a "Petition
to Return Private Papers, Books and Other Property" which had been
seized earlier without a warrant. This petition was denied and the defendant
was ultimately convicted in part on the strength of the unlawfully seized
evidence. The Weeks Court, standing squarely on fourth amendment grounds,
held that the materials in question should have been returned to the defendant
and that their admission at trial was prejudicial error.20
St. Tr. at 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. at 807. In his decision Lord Camden was careful to state the
dangers involved in the case: "[MIf this point should be determined in favour of the jurisdiction,
the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search
and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even to
suspect, a person to be the author, printer or publisher of a seditious libel." 19 How. St. Tr. at
1063, 95 Eng. Rep. at -. The Boyd Court concentrated on Lord Camden's characterization of a
basic right to privacy: "The great end for which man entered into society was to secure their
property.... Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property; and are so
far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection ... ." Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066,
95 Eng. Rep. 807, - (1765)).
14. 116 U.S. at 635. The Court stressed that compelling production of papers is as seriously
violative of the right to privacy and the fourth amendment as the breaking of doors and the
rummaging through drawers. Id. at 630. It should be noted that this conclusion was a matter of
some debate with the Boyd Court. Chief Justice Waite joined Justice Miller in his concurring
opinion which stated that while the decision was correct on fifth amendment grounds, there was
no fourth amendment question involved since there was no "search" or "seizure" within the
meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 633.
16. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
17. Id. at 594.
18. Id. at 598. It should also be noted that the Court in Adams stopped short of overruling
Boyd, which it distinguished on its facts. Id. at 597.
19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20. "If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
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Although Weeks represented a clear statement of the exclusionary require-
ment, the newly proclaimed rule did not find universal acceptance. Dean
Wigmore commented that the Court was "moved . . . by misplaced
sentimentality" in its decision.2" There was a sharp division of opinion among
the states concerning the rule. In the thirty years following Weeks a total of
sixteen states found themselves in agreement with the doctrine, while thirty-
one rejected it.22 Typical of the concern of many states was the thinking
expressed by Judge Cardozo in People v. Defore:23
A room is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If the
place of discovery may not be proved, the other circumstances may be insufficient to
connect the defendant with the crime. The privacy of the home has been infringed,
and the murderer goes free.... Like instances can be multiplied. We may not subject
society to these dangers until the Legislature has spoken with a clearer voice.24
Indeed the concern of that period is best summarized by Cardozo's oft-quoted
lament: "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. 25
Despite the misgivings of some state courts, the Supreme Court continued
to pursue its policy of "liberal construction" of the fourth amendment. 26
During the period following the enunciation of the Weeks doctrine, the rule of
exclusion was held to apply to the "fruits" of the illegally seized evidence as
well as to the evidence itself,27 and to warrantless seizures of papers made
during a "friendly visit" to a would-be defendant. 28
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." Id. at 393. The Court in Weeks
distinguished Adams v. New York on its facts. Adams involved the seizure of papers incidental to
the execution of an otherwise valid warrant. Id. at 396.
21. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479, 480
(1922).
22. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1949). It .hbuld be noted that only one state prior
to 1914 had anticipated the Weeks decision and had excluded evidence that was illegally seized.
Id. Thus, while the division among the states was significant during the post-Weeks period, the
trend was in the direction of acceptance of the doctrine.
23. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
24. Id. at 23-24, 150 N.E. at 588. Defore involved the seizure of a dangerous weapon
incidental to the execution of a valid warrant authorizing the search for stolen goods. Cardozo
based his decision on Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) (see notes 16-18 supra and
accompanying text), and noted that later decisions of the Supreme Court were not binding since
they were applicable only to the federal courts. 242 N.Y. at 20, 150 N.E. at 587.
25. 242 N.Y. at 21, 150 N.E. at 587. For a thorough exposition of the arguments for and
against the rule offered during the post-Weeks period, see Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law,
24 Cornell L.Q. 337, 369-85 (1939).
26. E.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
27. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920). The Court In
Silverthorne established the rule that facts gained from the use of illegally seized evidence may be
used if knowledge of such facts was gained from an independent source. Id. at 392.
28. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921). The decision in Gouled is also known
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One of the key issues left to be decided in the wake of the Weeks decision
was the application of the exclusionary rule to state criminal prosecutions.
The Court squarely faced this question in 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado.29 Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Court, recognized that the fourteenth amendment
required the incorporation of all rights "implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty.' "30 While he admitted that the right to privacy against "arbitrary
intrusion by the police" is a fundamental freedom, he stated that "the ways of
enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different order." 31 Justice
Frankfurter viewed the Weeks rule of exclusion not as an explicit requirement
of the fourth amendment, but rather as a matter of judicial implication.
Holding that "[d]ue process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor
narrow requirements," 32 the Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to
state criminal justice systems.
In the ten years following Wolf there were a total of seven changes in the
personnel of the Supreme Court.33 These changes involved four of the six
members of the Wolf majority3 as well as two of the three dissenters. 3s As the
complexion of the Court changed, so too did the Court's approach to the
exclusionary rule.
B. The Warren Court Approach and Its Critics
The early years of the Warren Court did not bring dramatic change to the
law of search and seizure as it had to other areas of the law. 36 Typical of the
for its answer to the general common law rule (see note 9 supra and accompanying text) that the
courts will not pause to consider the means by which evidence is obtained. The Court, through
Mr. Justice Clark, stated. "While this is a rule of great practical importance, yet, after all, it is
only a rule of procedure, and therefore it is not to be applied as a hard and fast formula to every
case, regardless of its special circumstances. We think rather that it is a rule to be used to secure
the ends of justice under the circumstances presented by each case .... A rule of practice must
not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a constitutional righL" 255 U.S. at 312-13.
29. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
30. Id. at 27 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
31. 338 U.S. at 27-28. The Court in Wolf noted that protection other than that afforded by
the exclusionary rule existed for those injured by illegal searches and seizures. Among such
remedies mentioned were private actions for damages and punishment for those maliciously
procuring the improper searches. Id. at 30 n.l. "Granting that in practice the exclusion of
evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to
condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's
reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective." Id. at
31.
32. Id. at 27. It should be noted that strong dissents to this decision were filed by Justice
Douglas, id. at 40, and Justice Rutledge, id. at 47.
33. H. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appointments to the Supreme
Court 224-49 (1974).
34. The members of the majority leaving the Court included Justices Jackson, \rmson, Reed,
and Burton. Justice Frankfurter and Justice Black remained to become members of the Warren
Court.
35. Dissenters Rutledge and Murphy died during this period, while Justice Douglas remained
to join the Warren Court.
36. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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treatment given to the exclusionary rule was the Court's decision in Irvine v.
California.37 In its five to four majority decision, 38 the Court denounced the
repeated entry into the defendant's home by the local police for the purpose
of placing listening devices to gather evidence. 39 However, consistent with the
Wolf Court's view of the exclusionary rule as a federal remedy, the Irvine
Court declined to extend the doctrine to state prosecutions. 40
The change of personnel on the Court,4 1 as well as growing disenchantment
with the deterrent value of the alternative remedies recognized earlier by the
Wolf Court4 2 began to intensify concern during the mid-to-late fifties. As a
new decade was ushered in, it became apparent that a significant change in
the Court's attitude toward the fourth amendment exclusionary rule was at
hand. Embodying this new attitude were the landmark decisions in Elkins v.
United States43 and Mapp v. Ohio.44
Elkins involved a defendant accused of intercepting wire communications
in violation of the Communications Act. The incriminating evidence in that
case included a tape recorder and other wiretapping paraphernalia. These
articles were originally seized by state officers pursuant to a warrant which
authorized them to search for obscene movies. The illegally seized materials
were then secured by the state officials in a safety deposit box. Federal agents
seized the material pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of
the contents of the safety deposit box. Although state prosecution was
abandoned, the federal government pursued its case. 45
In Elkins the Supreme Court critically examined what had come to be
known as the "silver platter doctrine." This doctrine permitted evidence
improperly secured by state law enforcement officials to be used in federal
prosecutions as long as federal officers were not involved in the fourth
amendment violation. The rule was an outgrowth of the Supreme Court's
decision in Burdeau v. McDowell,4 6 in which material stolen by a private
37. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
38. The "swing man" in this case was Mr. Justice Clark who yielded to precedent and
grudgingly concurred. Id. at 138-39. It is interesting to note that the majority also included the
new Chief Justice.
39. "Few police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and
persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth Amendment ... ." Id. at
132.
40. Id. at 132-34. The plurality, through Mr. Justice Jackson, expressed its doubts concerning
the effectiveness of the rule: "The extent to which (illegal searches and seizures by federal officers
were] curtailed, if at all, is doubtful. The lower federal courts, and even this Court, have
repeatedly been constrained to enforce the rule after its violation. There is no reliable evidence
known to us that inhabitants of those states which exclude the evidence suffer less from lawless
searches and seizures than those of states that admit It." Id. at 135-36.
41. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
42. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
43. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. The facts in Elkins are set out in 364 U.S. at 206-08.
46. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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individual found its way to the hands of an assistant attorney general. That
decision had held that the purloined material could be used in the criminal
prosecution of the original owner since the fourth amendment was deemed to
be a restraint only upon the "activities of sovereign authority.1
47
If viewed narrowly, it is apparent that Elkins was dispositve of the "silver
platter" question. The Court held that "evidence obtained by state officers
during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated
the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment is inadmissible over the defendant's timely objection in a
federal criminal trial."148 A closer reading of the opinion, however, reveals the
reasoning that set the stage for later innovation.
In his opinion for the Court in Elkins, Justice Stewart did two things of
significance in his analysis of the facts presented: (1) he defined a nexus
between state law enforcement officials and the exclusionary rule as it applied
to federal officers; 49 and (2) he examined the rationale underlying the contro-
versial doctrine.
Justice Stewart found his nexus in his reading of Wolf v. Colorado."° While
he recognized the Wolf Court's refusal to incorporate specific remedies into the
fourteenth amendment, he concentrated on what the Wolf Court did incorpo-
rate, namely the principle that " '[t]he security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police.., is... implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause.' "'I The effect of Wolf was seen to be the "removal of the doctrinal
underpinning" for the admissibility of state-seized evidence in federal prosecu-
tions. S2
In defending the federal system's use of the exclusionary rule, Stewart
introduced the two-part rationale that was to become the hallmark of the
Warren Court's treatment of the subject. First, there was the assertion of the
deterrent value of the rule.5 3 For support, Stewart turned to the federal
47. Id. at 475-76. See generally McCormick, supra note 9, § 168, at 371-74.
48. 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
49. Although Justice Stewart felt compelled to consider the application of the exclusionary
rule's principles to state officials for the purpose of dealing with the "silver platter" question, he
was careful to note that the decision was not meant to interfere with any state's right to apply its
own sanctions to fourth amendment violations. Id. at 221. Thus states were still free to decline
the application of an exclusionary rule.
50. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
51. 364 U.S. at 213.
52. Id. Having removed such underpinnings, the Court in Elkins felt obliged to apply the
rule of exclusion to a state seizure as an exercise of its "supervisory power over the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts. . . ." Id. at 216. This use of Wolf drew charp criticism
from Justice Frankfurter in his dissent. Id. at 237-38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It should be
noted that Justice Frankfurter was the author of the Court's opinion in Wolf.
53. "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it." 364 U.S. at 217.
1977]
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experience during "almost half a century" under the Weeks doctrine. 5 4 He also
pointed to the experience of the states, whose movement towards the rule of
exclusion was felt to have been "halting but seemingly inexorable."" The
second part of the dual rationale arose quite apart from considerations of
reason and experience. The Court called it "the imperative of judicial
integrity."'5 6 Agreeing with Justice Holmes in an earlier dissent, the Elkins
Court felt that "it [is] a less evil that some criminals should escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part. '5 7
The Court's decision to abandon the silver platter doctrine represented a
significant extension of the exclusionary rule. Moreover, the impact of the
reasoning employed in that decision was expanded just one year later when
the Court again turned its attention to the issue of the exclusionary rule in
state prosecutions. In Mapp v. Ohio,5 8 the Court reconsidered its holding in
Wolf v. Colorado.5 9 The result was a controversial decision, which held that
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures made in violation of the fourth
amendment was inadmissible in state criminal trials.
60
Mr. Justice Clark spoke for the Court and turned first to what he viewed as
the "factual considerations" behind the Wolf decision. 6 1 The primary object of
Clark's scrutiny was the Wolf Court's conclusion that the "contrariety of views
of the States" in accepting or rejecting the rule was "particularly impres-
sive."'62 He reviewed the new data that had been presented on the subject
prior to Elkins63 and concurred with Justice Stewart's characterization of
state movement toward the rule as "inexorable." '64
Justice Clark then took the Court one critical step beyond the Elkins
analysis of the states' experience. He examined the California Supreme
54. Id. at 218. Stewart noted that empirical statistics were not available to gauge the success
of the rule. However, he suggested that the doctrine of suppression was supported by the fact that
the FBI had not been rendered ineffective while operating under the exclusionary rule. Id.
55. Id. at 219. The Court went to great lengths to profile state treatment of illegally seized
evidence. It noted that by 1960 a majority of states (26) had moved legislatively or by judicial
review to exclude such evidence from criminal prosecutions. See Table I in Appendix to the
Opinion of the Court, id. at 224-25.
56. Id. at 222. While some notion of judicial integrity had been discussed in broad terms In
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914), thie idea was more clearly defined in the
dissents of Brandeis and Holmes in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
57. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
58. 376 U.S. 643 (1961).
59. 338 U.S. 25 (1949); see notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
60. 367 U.S. at 655 (1961). It should be noted that the appellant in Mapp did not urge the
overruling of Wolf. Rather, she argued "what may have appeared to be the surer ground for
favorable disposition .... Id. at 646 n.3. The review of Wolf was urged by the amicus curiae.
Consequently, dissenters to the decision sharply criticized the majority for having "reached out"
to overrule the Wof position. Id. at 673 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. 367 U.S. at 651-53.
62. Id. at 651. For the Wolf Court's view, see 338 U.S. at 29-30.
63. 367 U.S. at 651; see note 54 supra and accompanying text.
64. 367 U.S. at 651; see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 219 (1960).
[Vol. 46
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule in People v. Cahan.65 The state
court had felt " 'compelled [to adopt the rule] because other remedies [had]
completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions
.... 66 From this, Justice Clark concluded that "[[i]t... plainly appears that
the factual considerations supporting the failure of the Wolf Court to include
the Weeks exclusionary rule . . . could not, in any analysis, now be deemed
controlling. '67
After distinguishing Wolf, and expressing its deep concern with the failure
of alternative remedies, the Mapp Court turned to the dual rationale
employed in the Elkins opinion a year before, stressing both the deterrent
value of the rule68 and the imperative of judicial integrity. 69
The link between the federal rule of exclusion and state prosecutions was
found in the Court's earlier reading of Wolf v. Colorado in Elkins.70 Once
again the Court seized upon Wolf's recognition of the right to privacy from
arbitrary police intrusion as being "implicit in the concept of ordered liber-
ty"7 1 and, as such, enforceable against the states. The Court felt
led by [Wof] to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of [the] basic right [to privacy] reserved to all
65. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
66. 367 U.S. at 651 (quoting People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12
(1955)).
The Court in Elkins and Mapp used the California experience to demonstrate both the success
of the rule and the failure of other remedies. In Elkins, the Court cited what it felt was a
favorable reaction to the Cahan decision on the part of law enforcement officials. 364 U.S. at
220-21. Actually, a closer reading reveals a split of opinion on this point. See Note, Two Years
with the Cahan Rule, 9 Stanford L. Rev. 515, 538 (1957).
In Mapp, Justice Clark cited Cahan as evidence of the failure of alternatives to the rule.
Without further analysis or citation of authority he went on to observe: "The experience of
California that such other remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience
of other States." 367 U.S. at 652. Justice Clark also pointed to Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954), as an example of the Supreme Court's iecognition of the obvious futility of alternative
remedies. (In fairness, however, it should be noted that the Irvine Court had also been dubious as
to the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. 347 U.S. at 135-36; see note 59 supra and
accompanying text.)
The dissenters in Mapp did not directly address themselves to this rather strained interpretation
of the California experience. Moreover, little light was shed on the question of whether states not
subscribing to the rule of exclusion suffered more from unlawful police practices than did those
employing the doctrine. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. at 135-36. The somewhat superficial
treatment of some issues in Mapp has been attributed to the fact that the Wolf question had not
been fully briefed and argued on appeal (see note 59 supra) and has led at least one supporter of
the decision to comment that "Mapp must surely rank as one of the untidiest decisions in which
the modern Court has announced a salient constitutional doctrine .... " R. McCloskey, The
Modern Supreme Court 244 (1972).
67. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 653.
68. Id. at 656; see note 53 supra and accompanying text.
69. 367 U.S. at 659; see notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
71. 367 U.S. at 655.
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persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct ....
[W]ithout that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'7 2
The Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio has been considered a "watershed" in
the area of state criminal procedure. 73 Its effect on such procedures has been
said to be the most "dramatic and traumatic" in recent memory. 74 Although
the debate regarding the exclusionary rule had been lively for many years,75
controversy intensified as the Warren Court faced the fire of its critics. 76 Some
opponents of the rule have denounced the Court's "suppression of [the]
truth"77 in favor of a fox hunting approach where the rules of the game were
more important than the ultimate end. 78 Others have pointed to the costs
to society of a rule that allows the guilty to go free. 79 The Mapp Court was
72. Id. at 654-55. It is interesting to compare Justice Clark's use of this reading of Wolf with
Justice Frankfurter's earlier dissenting opinion in Elkins, which Clark had joined: "In this use of
Wolf the Court disregards not only what precisely was said there, namely, that only what was
characterized as the 'core of the Fourth Amendment,' not the Amendment itself, is enforceable
against the States, but also the fact that what was said in Wolf was said with reference to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not with reference to the specific guarantees of
the Fourth Amendment. The scope and effect of these two constitutional provisions cannot be
equated, as the Court would have it. These are constitutional provisions wholly different in
history, scope and incidence, and that is crucial to our problem." 364 U.S. at 237-38 (Frankfurt-
er, J., dissenting).
73. P. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court 190 (1970).
74. Murphy, The Problems of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 Texas L. Rev. 939, 941
(1966).
75. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960); see, e.g., Plumb, Illegal Enforcement
of the Law, 24 Cornell L.Q. 337 (1939); Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 Mich. L. Rev.
169 (1955); Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479
(1922). The last comprehensive debate on the exclusionary rule before Mapp can be found in The
Exclusionary Rule Regarding Illegally Seized Evidence: An International Symposium, 52 J.
Crim. L.C. & P.S. 245 (1961).
76. See, e.g., J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society
(1967); Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Burger]; Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mirtake, 19 DePaul L. Rev. 80 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Burns]; LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary
Rule--Current Police and Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. Rev. 391 (1965); Murphy, The Problem of
Compliance by Police Departments, 44 Texas L. Rev. 930 (1966); Oaks, Studying the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Oaks]; Wingo,
Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971); Comment, Effect of
Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure in Narcotic., Cases, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 87
(1968).
77. Burger, supra note 76, at 23.
78. McCormick, supra note 9, § 166, at 367.
79. Id. at 367; Oaks, supra note 76, at 736-39. For discussions of examples of the high cost
the rule imposes on society, see Murphy, The Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44
Texas L. Rev. 939, 942-46 (1966), and Burns, supra note 76, at 92-94.
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also criticized for assuming a posture deemed contrary to traditional notions
of federalism by effectively precluding local approaches to search and seizure
problems.80
The major thrust of the criticism of the Mapp decision, however, concerned
the notion of the exclusionary rule as an effective deterrent to improper police
conduct. It has been generally accepted that deterrence is the main purpose of
the rule.8 1 Although critical commentators agree that it is quite difficult to
assess the impact of Mapp,8 2 many have concluded that the exclusionary rule
is ill-suited as a deterrent in theory8 3 or has been of little value in practice. 84
Several factors have been cited in support of this position. These include: (1)
the lack of effective departmental discipline for errant police officers, 8s (2) a
limited capability-because of poor communications, lack of time, or lack of
technical expertise-on the part of police officers for grasping the subtleties of
appellate decisions,8 6 and (3) the fact that the overwhelming portion of police
duties do not result in prosecution.8 7 Indeed it is felt by some critics that
concern with Mapp requirements may well have resulted in misrepresentation
of facts in court by police officers.88
Some attempts at empirical study of the effect of the Mapp decision have
been made.89 These studies reviewed police practices and courtroom data
in an effort to gauge the impact of Mapp requirements. Two leading studies
have noted some effect on standard police procedures, but have generally
concluded that the deterrent effect of the decision is minimal. 90
80. Bums, supra note 76, at 100-01.
81. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), which stated that the purpose of the Mapp
decision was to "deter the lawless action of the police. . . ." Id. at 637. The Court in Linkletter
went on to deny retroactive effect to the Mapp exclusionary rule. This decision has been deemed
indicative of the primacy of the deterrence factor. See Oaks, supra note 76, at 670.
82. J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society 212 (1966);
LaFave, Improving Police Peformance Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30 Mo. L. Rev. 391,
394-95; Oaks, supra note 76, at 712.
83. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 76, at 10-11; Burns, supra note 76, at 95-96.
84. Oaks, supra note 76, at 706-08; Comment, Effect of Mopp v. Ohio on Police Search-and.
Seizure in Narcotics Cases, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 87, 104 (1968).
85. Burger, supra note 76, at 11; Oaks, supra note 76, at 724-27.
86. McCormick, supra note 9, § 166, at 367; Burger, supra note 76, at 11; Burns, supra note
76, at 100; LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30 Mo. L.
Rev. 391, 402-03 (1965); Murphy, The Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 Texas
L. Rev. 939, 944-45 (1966).
87. Oaks, supra note 76, at 755.
88. McCormick, supra note 9, § 166, at 367; J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law
Enforcement in a Democratic Society 214-15 (1966); Bums, supra note 76, at 96; Oaks, supra note
76, at 739-42.
89. Oaks, supra note 76; Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of tse Exclusion-
ary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. Legal Studies 243 (1973); Comment, Effect of Mfapp v. Ohio on
Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 87 (1968).
90. The most comprehensive of the three major studies in this area was conducted by
Professor Oaks. See Oaks, supra note 76. Oaks called for the abandonment of the exclusionary
rule once effective alternatives could be created. Id. at 755-57. Oaks stated the reason for his
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Criticism of Mapp v. Ohio was not confined to the esoteric tracts of legal
commentators. During the 1960's a great deal of political heat was being
generated by the Warren Court. Mapp was one of a series of controversial
decisions in the area of criminal procedure9 1 which exposed the Warren Court
to the sharp attack of its partisan detractors. 92 One such opponent was then
Vice President Richard Nixon. Mr. Nixon spoke out strongly concerning the
Warren Court's line of precedent: "The barbed wire of legalisms that a
majority of one of the Supreme Court has erected to protect a suspect from
invasion of his rights has effectively shielded hundreds of criminals from
punishment . . . . "93 Nixon's words took on special significance because he
was a candidate for President of the United States. On the night he accepted
his party's nomination, he reinforced this theme:
Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who serve on them, but let us also
recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the
peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country.
Let those who have the responsibility to enforce our laws, and our judges who have
the responsibility to interpret them, be dedicated to the great principles of civil rights.
But let them also recognize that the first civil right of every American is to be free from
domestic violence. And that right must be guaranteed in this country. 94
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BURGER COURT APPROACH
Just four months after taking office, President Richard Nixon seized the
opportunity to fulfill his campaign pledge. On May 21, 1969, he nominated
Warren E. Burger to replace the retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren. 95 At the
time Burger was serving as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. During his tenure on the court of appeals,
Judge Burger had often showed himself a vigorous dissenter on a panel of
jurists of the Warren Court genre. Indeed, Burger's opinion of exclusionary
rules became well documented during this period. 96 His denunciations were
conclusion quite simply: "As a device for directly deterring illegal searches and seizures by the
police, the exclusionary rule is a failure .... What is known about the deterrent effect of
sanctions suggests that the exclusionary rule operates under conditions that are extremely
unfavorable for deterring the police ... . It is the sole means of enforcing the essential guarantees
of freedom from unreasonable arrests and searches and seizures by law enforcement officers, and
it is a failure in that vital task." Id. at 755. See also Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. Legal Studies 243, 276 (1973).
91. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (required presence of counsel at pretrial identification proceedings); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (accused must be fully advised of constitutional rights upon being
placed in custody); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (accused must be advised of the right
to remain silent and consult counsel upon being placed in custody).
92. See generally P. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court (1970).
93. R.- Nixon, Toward Freedom From Fear 13 (1068).
94. N.Y. Times, August 10, 1968, at 20, col. 4.
95. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
96. See, e.g., Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The majority held
inadmissible an oral confession made by a criminal defendant after he was brought before a
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not confined to his judicial opinions as he also expressed his criticisms in print
and at the lecturn. 97 Clearly, Burger represented the prototype of President
Nixon's sought-after "strict constructionist."
Even as Judge Burger was being nominated for Chief Justice, President
Nixon was faced with the prospect of filling a second seat on the Court left
vacant by the resignation of Associate Justice Abe Fortas six days earlier. 9
After two unsuccessful nominations,99 Nixon offered the name of Judge Harry
A. Blackmun of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Blackmun's
appointment was unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate on May
12, 1970.100
Like Burger, Blackmun was a judicial conservative. In fact, it was Burger
who reportedly had suggested Blackmun's name for the position.10 ' These
two men, close friends since boyhood, formed the nucleus of what was
already being called the "Nixon Court."
A. Early Dissents
President Nixon had the unique opportunity of filling two Supreme Court
vacancies during his first year in office. While the addition of Burger and
Blackmun represented a significant step in "balancing" the Court, it fell far
short of creating a Nixon majority. Consequently, the developing Burger
Court attitude toward the exclusionary rule is best traced by examining
significant dissenting opinions of this earlier period. These dissents often
foreshadowed later Burger Court refusals to extend the rule.
At the very heart of a refusal to extend any legal doctrine is the recognition
that the doctrine in question is limited in application. In his dissent in
magistrate since such a confession was deemed to be the "fruit" of a prior written confession
illegally obtained prior to his appearance before the magistrate. Judge Burger, dissenting, did
little to hide his disaffection with the exclusionary rule, stating that "the Suppression Doctrine has
totally failed to achieve its stated objective [of compelling official compliance with certain
constitutional provisions such as the prohibition of unreasonable searches.]... [T~he Suppression
Doctrine is a manifestation of sterile indignation, and is essentially negative. It punishes society as
a whole for the transgressions of a poorly trained or badly motivated policeman but does nothing
to get at the heart of the problem." Id. at 257-58 n.5 (Burger, J., dissenting).
Burger's dissent in Killough also reveals his dissatisfaction with court opinions that appeared to
him to have been legislative in nature. Concerning the nature of the judicial function he wrote:
"Some of the members of the court might remember that there are other branches of government
at least equally qualified to frame the laws, explicitly ordained to do just that, and no less
concerned than we are with individual liberty. Our task as judges, properly exercised, is a narrow
one: to interpret the lawsfaithjfdUy as Congress wrote them, not as we think Congress ought to
have provided." Id. at 260 (Burger, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
97. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 76.
98. For a discussion of the events surrounding the Fortas resignation, see J. Simon, In His
Own Image: The Supreme Court in Richard Nixon's America 97-124 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Simon].
99. For a discussion of the abortive nominations of Clement Haynsworth, Jr., and G.
Harrold Carswell, see Simon, supra note 98, at 104-22. See also R. Harris, Decision (1971).
100. Note, Exclusionary Rule Under Attack, 4 U. Balt. L. Rev. 89, n.1 (1974).
101. Simon, supra note 98, at 148.
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Whiteley v. Warden,'10 2 Mr. Justice Black reminded the majority that the
fourth amendment "does not expressly command that evidence obtained by its
infraction should always be excluded from proof."' 0 3 Justice Black was joined
in his opinion by the Chief Justice and, in large measure, by Justice
Blackmun. 10 4 The majority in Whiteley was unconvinced, however, and
sanctioned the suppression of evidence found to have been improperly ob-
tained. 05s
The requirement of exclusion was reinforced later that year in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire.10 6 In that case vacuum sweepings taken from the au-
tomobile of the defendant were excluded from evidence because the search
had been executed pursuant to an invalid search warrant. 10 7 Once again
Burger and Blackmun expressed their doubts concerning exclusion as a
requirement of the fourth or fifth amendment.' 08
The clearest of the early statements of dissatisfaction with the exclusionary
rule can be found in Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 10 9 There the Court held that a
common law cause of action against police officers for unreasonable searches
and seizures existed by operation of the fourth amendment. 110 Burger dis-
sented, stating that it was not the Court's place to "legislate" such a rem-
edy."' He noted that the case had "significance far beyond its facts and its
holding," and he took this opportunity to examine the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. 112
Burger's dissent largely reflected the arguments typical of the critics of the
Warren Court approach to illegal search and seizure.11 3 The twin imperatives
of deterrence and judicial integrity were critically re-examined. With regard
to the deterrent value of the rule, he cited the Oaks study of the effects of the
102. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
103. Id. at 572 (Black, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 575 (Black, J., dissenting).
105. The majority in Whiteley held that an arrest by a police officer pursuant to a police radio
bulletin which was issued without probable cause was itself made without probable cause.
Consequently, the majority excluded evidence seized incidental to the improper arrest. Justice
Black labeled the decision "a gross and wholly indefen.ible miscarriage of justice." Id. at 570
(Black, J., dissenting).
106. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
107. 403 U.S. at 449. Although the police authorities had obtained a search warrant in
Coolidge, the warrant was found to be invalid since it was issued by the state's Attorney General
acting as a justice of the peace. The Court felt that such issuance did not meet the required
"neutral and detached magistrate" standard. Id. at 449-53.
108. Id. at 492-93 (Burger, C.J.,dissenting), at 510 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). Justice Harlan,
who left the Court in September 1971, went one step further in Coolidge by calling for the
overruling of Mapp v. Ohio in order to provide the Court with an opportunity to evaluate the
experience of the states as part of a thorough re-examination of the law of search and seizure. Id.
at 490-91 (Harlan, J., concurring).
109. 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., di:senting).
110. Id. at 390-97.
111. Id. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
113. See notes 76-90 supra and accompanying text
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Mapp decision1 14 and observed that no empirical evidence existed to support a
claim of actual deterrence.115 Moreover, Burger asserted that the imperative
of judicial integrity did not necessarily mandate the exclusion of tainted
evidence. Development of an effective alternative to the rule would meet the
requirement of judicial integrity while allowing as full an airing of reliable
evidence as possible.11 6 The Chief Justice also expressed a deep concern over
the costs borne by society as a result of the rule.1 1
7
In spite of his seeming antipathy to the exclusionary rule, Burger made two
significant statements: (1) that he did not question the need for some remedy
"to give meaning and teeth to the constitutional guarantees against unlawful
conduct by government officials," 118 and (2) that he was opposed to abandon-
ing the rule until some meaningful alternative could be developed.13 9 One
solution, he suggested, would be to establish an administrative or quasi-
judicial remedy for those whose fourth amendment rights had been violated.
This would allow, inter alia, suits against appropriate government agencies
through a waiver of sovereign immunity.1 20
In sum, the dissenting opinions of the early Burger Court foreshadowed
later refusals to extend the exclusionary rule. They demonstrate the disaffec-
tion of Justices Burger and Blackmun with the rule in general and with its
broad application. This is especially reflected in Bivens where Chief Justice
Burger stated: "Independent of the alternative embraced in this. . . opinion,
I believe the time has come to re-examine the scope of the exclusionary rule
114. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
115. 403 U.S. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 414 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also noted that the legal
systems of England and Canada did not require the exclusion of evidence. In this respect
American law was unique. Id. at 415. See also Martin, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign
Law-Canada, 52 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 271 (1961); Wrilliams, The Exclusionary Rule Under
Foreign Law-England, 52 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 272 (1961).
117. He stated that "[slome clear demonstration of the benefits and effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule is required to justify it in view of the high price it extracts from society-the
release of countless guilty criminals." 403 U.S. at 416 (Burger, C.J.,dissenting).
118. Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 422-23 (Burger, C.J. dissenting). It was suggested that several provisions be
included in any such legislation. These were: (1) a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to
illegal acts committed by law enforcement officials while in the performance of their duties; (2)
creation of a cause of action for those aggrieved by the conduct of officials which violated the
Constitution or other statutory constraints; (3) the establishment of a quasi-judicial tribunal
patterned after the Court of Claims; (4) a provision stating that the statutory remedy was in lieu
of any remedy of exclusion of evidence; and (5) a provision directing that otherwise admissible
evidence should not be excluded because of violations of the fourth amendment. Id.
At least two attempts on the federal level were made to codify the Burger suggestions. Senate
bill 2657 was introduced by Senator Bentsen of Texas on October 6, 1971, S. 2657, 2d Cong., 1st
Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 35183 (1971), and reintroduced on February 15, 1973, S. 881, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 4195 (1973). The bill was referred on both occasions to the Committee
on the Judiciary where it never came to a vote.
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and consider at least some narrowing of its thrust so as to eliminate the
anomalies it has produced."1 21
B. A New Majority Draws the Line
In September 1971 Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan both
retired. President Nixon continued his attempt to "balance" the Court by
searching for judicial conservatives to fill the vacancies. This search culmi-
nated in the appointment of William Rehnquist and Lewis Powell. The
records of these two men suggested that the President had found his judicial
conservatives. 2 2 Upon their ascent to the Court, the new Associate Justices
became key participants in a new majority that was to re-examine the Court's
position on the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. 123
The Warren Court approach to the fourth amendment was marked by its
extensions of the exclusionary rule. The Burger Court has distinguished itself
on the other hand by its repeated refusals to extend the rule. Early in its
reconsideration of the exclusionary rule, the Burger Court sought to arrive at
"reasonable" decisions that seemed calculated to untie the hands of law
enforcement personnel and to avoid the rule's most adverse effects. Two
'decisions during the October 1972 term illustrate this point.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 24 the Court held that warrantless searches
may be conducted with the voluntary consent of the target even in the
absence of a specific warning by the police advising the suspect of his right to
withhold his consent. 125 The Court expressed concern with the burden of such
a warning requirement on reasonable, routine police practices. Voluntariness,
then, was to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. 126 The
reasonableness of police practices was addressed again one month later in
Cady v. Dombrowski. 127 Dombrowski was a Chicago policeman who had
been arrested in a neighboring state for drunken driving immediately follow-
ing an automobile accident. While the defendant was hospitalized and in a
comatose state, local police conducted a warrantless search of his automobile
in the hope of locating and removing his service revolver. Evidence was
121. 403 U.S. at 424 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
122. At the time of his appointment William Rehnquist was serving as an Assistant Attorney
General in the Mitchell Justice Department. Before that he had engaged in private practice In
Phoenix, Arizona, where he was a participant in many conservative and partisan Republican
causes. Lewis Powell was a practicing attorney in Virginia in 1971 and a former president of the
American Bar Association. Powell had always ranked high on Attorney General John Mitchell's
list of candidates to fill Supreme Court vacancies. For a more detailed discussion of the careers of
Rehnquist and Powell and the circumstances surrounding their nominations, see Simon, supra
note 98, at 215-51.
123. In the years that followed, the four Nixon appointees were joined by at least one other
member of the Court (most often Justice Byron White) to create a majority that would transform
earlier dissents into precedent.
124. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
125. Id. at 249.
126. Id. at 248-49.
127. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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found during the search which ultimately linked Dombrowski to a murder.
The Court validated this police procedure stating that the search was not
"unreasonable" merely because no warrant had been issued.1'8
Both Schneckloth and Dombrowski were indicative of an intent to create
exceptions to the rule of exclusion based upon a notion of reasonable police
conduct. Dombrowski was especially significant since it seemed to contradict
the notion originally enunciated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire'2 9 that
warrantless searches were unreasonable per se unless the circumstances fitted
one or more narrowly defined exceptions.
130
With this pragmatic approach established, the Court considered the efficacy
of the exclusionary rule in various situations. One of these was searches
incidental to arrest. The new Court's attitude toward this subject was
foreshadowed in Cupp v. Murphy. 13 1 There Justice Stewart, speaking for the
majority, upheld the warrantless taking of fingernail scrapings from a suspect
while that suspect was being questioned at police headquarters. Such a
seizure was allowed because of the "highly evanescent" nature of the evi-
dence. 132 Justices Burger and Blackmun agreed with the conclusion of the
Court but indicated that if the search were made incident to a lawful arrest it
would have been proper even absent the evanescence of the evidence. 1
33
During its 1973-74 term, the Burger Court issued a series of decisions which
gave a wide berth to officers conducting warrantless searches incident to
arrest. 134 One such decision was United States v. Robinson.13 S In that case
the defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle without a valid
operator's permit. During a routine "pat-down," the arresting officer detected
a bulge in the defendant's pocket, which was found to contain fourteen gelatin
capsules of heroin.1 36 Earlier "stop and frisk" cases had required that an
officer's actions, absent a warrant, reflect a fear for his own safety and that
the search be limited to a search for weapons on the person of the suspect.
137
128. Id. at 446.
129. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
130. Id. at 453-82. Justice Brennan's dissent in Dombrowski urged the application of the per
se principle. 413 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the Burger Court has not
specifically overruled the language in Coolidge, its decisions have ignored the per se principle
despite some very vocal dissents. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 444 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 809 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
131. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
132. Id. at 296.
133. Id. at 300. (Burger and Blackmun, J.J., concurring).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (seizure of defendant's clothing
on the day following the arrest); Gustafson v.- Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (seizure of marijuana
following arrest for driving without proper motor vehicle registration).
135. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
136. Id. at 220-23.
137. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), upheld
the constitutionality of a warrantless seizure of weapons and other evidence following a pat-down
of persons suspected of being armed, dangerous, and engaging in criminal acts. A companion case
to Peters, however, had held that a simple field search where the officer was not acting in fear of
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Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court in Robinson, refused to apply such
requirements to a search incident to a lawful arrest. He argued that a routine
search of the defendant's person following arrest had been treated as an
exception to the application of the exclusionary rule since Weeks. 138 A clear
and broad exception to the warrant requirement was thus recognized.
Another question examined by the Burger Court was to what proceedings
the exclusionary rule should apply. In United States v. Calandra139 the
application of the rule to grand jury proceedings was considered, and it was
held that a grand jury witness may not refuse to testify concerning evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. 140 Mr. Justice Powell, speak-
ing for the Court, stated that "the exclusionary rule has never been inter-
preted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or
against all persons. As with any remedial device, the application of the rule
has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served."'1 4 1
The logic used by the Court in Calandra was as significant as the holding
itself. Two observations made by Justice Powell are of particular importance.
The first is the recognition that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is a
"judicially created remedy" and not a "personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved. ' 142 The second is that the "prime purpose" of the rule is "to
deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantees of
the Fourth Amendment." 143 Having established this dual premise the Court
was free to conclude that the exclusionary rule would only be applied where
its deterrent purpose was best served.1 44
his own safety and where he sought something other than weapons violated the fourth amend-
ment. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
138. 414 U.S. at 224-26. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell dealt even more forth-
rightly with this issue: "I believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains
no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person .... If the arrest is lawful,
the privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and
overriding governmental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate law enforcement by requiring
some independent justification for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest." Id. at 237
(Powell, J., concurring).
139. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
140. When the witness' business premises were searched pursuant to a warrant to look for
bookmaking records and paraphernalia, ledgers were discovered which raised questions concern-
ing a loansharking operation. Calandra was therefore called before a grand jury investigating
usurious practices. After invoking his fifth amendment privilege not to answer incriminating
questions, he was granted transactional immunity. He then attempted to avoid giving evidence
on fourth amendment grounds. Id. at 340-41.
141. Id. at 348.
142. Id. The Warren Court had left unclear the precise nature of the exclusionary rule. See
Adelson, Calandra and the Exclusionary Rule, 1974/1975 Annual Survey of Am. Law 153, 154.
143. 414 U.S. at 347. Support for this conclusion was found in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965), a decision of the Warren Court. See note 81 supra and accompanying text. It is
interesting to note that the then Judge Warren Burger recognized the primacy of the deterrence
rationale even before the Linkletter decision. Burger, supra note 76, at 10.
144. In considering whether the "remedial objectives" of the rule were "efficaciously served,"
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The effect of the Calandra ruling was quickly evidenced in case and
comment. State and federal courts were left free to reject the exclusionary rule
in proceedings other than criminal trials1 4s and in actions against witnesses
refusing to testify at trial. 146 Commentators, examining Powell's logic as well
as prior fourth amendment decisions, expressed their fears for the survival of
the exclusionary rule. 147 The reasoning of the Court was criticized by civil
libertarians for overlooking other salient factors, such as the imperative of
judicial integrity, which had been key elements in earlier Warren Court
decisions. 148 The decision was also attacked by those who viewed the rule as
a right 149 and by those who felt that the Burger Court was acting improperly
in its case-by-case assault on the rule. 150
Subsequent rulings by the Burger Court did nothing to change the Court's
position that the rule was a "judicially created remedy." Nor did the Court
relent in its war of attrition. It did, however, feel compelled to deal with the
notion of judicial integrity in United States v. Peltier. 's' The defendant in
Peltier was the object of a warrantless search made by Border Patrol agents
under circumstances similar to those which had been held to be unreasonable
by the Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. ,52 The search, however,
had occurred four months before the Almeida-Sanchez ruling, and so the issue
the Court examined the historic role and function of the grand jury and weighed them against the
potential benefits of exclusion. It concluded that exclusion would seriously impede the grand jury
and that any increase in the deterrent effect achieved by extending the rule to such proceedings
would be "uncertain at best." 414 U.S. at 349-52.
145. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 55 Hawaii 314, 318, 519 P.2d 228, 231 (1974) (Ogata, J.,
dissenting) (preliminary hearings); People v. Dowery, 20 Ill. App. 3d 738, 312 N.E.2d 682
(1974), aff'd, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975) (probation revocation hearing).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Weir, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038
(1974); In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924 (1974).
147. E.g., Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea
Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Irons, The Burger Court: Discord in
Search and Seizure, 8 U. Rich. L. Rev. 433, 439 (1974); Keefe, Contesting Searches and Seizures
After the 1972-1974 Terms of the United States Supreme Court, 49 Conn. B.J. 45 (1975);
Comment, Exclusionary Rule Under Attack, 4 U. Bait. L. Rev. 89 (1974); Note, The Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Past, Present, No Future, 12 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 507 (1975).
148. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the
Spiotta Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U. L. Rev. 740, 776-78 (1974);
Comment, Exclusionary Rule Under Attack, 4 U. Bat. L. Rev. 89, 123 (1974). But see Kaplan,
The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1029-32 (1974) (argument for rule
must stand or fall on its demonstrated utility).
149. E.g.,Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 Mmn. L. Rev. 251 (1974).
150. E.g., Keefe, Contesting Searches and Seizures After the 1972-1974 Terms of the United
States Supreme Court, 49 Conn. B.J. 45, 76 (1975); Comment, Exclusionary Rule Under Attack,
4 U. Balt. L. Rev. 89, 122-23 (1974).
151. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
152. 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (petitioner stopped while traveling about 25 miles from the Mexican
border on a California highway which did not extend to the border).
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was whether Almeida-Sanchez would be applied retroactively. The Court
declined to do so, turning to other retroactivity cases for guidance.153 Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, summed up the teaching of these cases by
noting that the rule of exclusion would not be applied when the remedial ends
of the rule (deterrence of unlawful police conduct) would not be advanced. 154
In stating this position, however, Justice Rehnquist was careful not to
ignore the judicial integrity argument. He argued that if police officials had
acted in good faith compliance with then-existing constitutional norms, the
imperative of judicial integrity would not be offended.' 5" He went on to find
that the considerations of judicial integrity and deterrence were not
sufficiently weighty to require the exclusion of the evidence in question. 1
5 6
In sum, the rulings of the Burger Court during the period 1972-1975 did
much to narrow the doctrine of exclusion. The Court's view of the deterrence
rationale allowed it to refuse to extend the rule to proceedings which did not
serve such an end. Moreover, the injection of the notion of official good faith
did much to disarm the "imperative" of judicial integrity. This disposition of
the Warren Court's two-pronged rationale resulted in confusion concerning
the direction of search and seizure law as well as in alarmed dissents by
Warren Court holdovers."1
7
C. Recent Refusals to Extend
On July 6, 1976, the Supreme Court delivered four decisions dealing with
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.15 8 All four of these decisions are
significant in their own right since each affects a different area of the law.
Their importance to the future of search and seizure law is best demonstrated,
however, by considering them as a group. For although these decisions can be
viewed individually as logical extensions of prior Burger Court rulings, their
collective significance is greater.
The treatment of the exclusionary rule in the four cases was more than a
continued fine tuning of the suppression doctrine. The examination was much
more fundamental. 5 9 Thus, for example, the Warren Court's dual rationale
of deterrence and judicial integrity was subjected to closer scrutiny, and other
themes emerged that shed light on the Court's thinking. Among these were its
153. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (196S).
154. "[W]e simply decline to extend the courtmade exclusionary rule to cases in which Its
deterrent purpose would not be served." 422 U.S. at 538 (1975) (quoting Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 254 n.24 (1969)).
155. 422 U.S. at 536. The Court felt that the judiciary could not be considered "accomplices
in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold" in light of such good faith
actions by police. Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960)).
156. Id. at 539-42.
157. See, e.g., 422 U.S. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976).
159. Between the Stone and Janis decisions, three Justices (Burger, Blackmun, and Powell)
offered analyses complete with a history of the development of the exclusionary rule.
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concern with the costs to society of the suppression of evidence and its
reliance upon a "balancing of interests" test.
The following discussion will outline the Court's holding in each of the four
cases with particular attention given to each decision's impact on the
exclusionary rule.
1. Civil Tax Proceedings: United States v. Janis
United States v. Janis160 was a suit brought against the federal government
by a taxpayer seeking a refund. The taxpayer, Max Janis, had been the object
of a substantial tax assessment based upon evidence seized by state officials
seeking to obtain his conviction on bookmaking charges. The evidence-
$4,940.00 in cash and wagering records-was seized pursuant to a warrant
supported by a defective affidavit. After the warrant was quashed, Janis sued
for return of the money which had by then been applied to a tax assessment
and the government counterclaimed for the balance of the assessment. The
question before the Court was whether "evidence seized by a state criminal
law enforcement officer in good faith, but nonetheless unconstitutionally,
[was] inadmissible in a civil proceeding by or against the United States?"' 6 1
The Supreme Court was quick to note that it had never applied the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule to evidence in a civil proceeding.1 62 In deter-
mining whether to extend the rule, the Court, through Justice Blackmun,
carefully reviewed the history of the doctrine from Boyd to the present. Citing
Elkins and Calandra, Justice Blackmun noted that the major purpose of the
rule was deterrence of official misconduct. 163 Under the circumstances of
Janis this purpose had been achieved by the exclusion of the tainted evidence
in state and federal criminal prosecutions. The Court reasoned that any
additional deterrence resulting from an extension of the rule to federal civil
proceedings was unnecessary. 16
This analysis of the rule in a civil setting closely paralleled the Court's
thinking in Calandra, where it was held that the doctrine would be applied
only where its ends were most efficaciously served.16S Justice Blackmun and
the Janis Court were not, however, content to end the argument there. In
Calandra the deterrent value of the rule was weighed against the historic role
of the grand jury. In Janis a new element was considered in the balancing
equation-the cost to society of the exclusionary rule.16 6 The Court noted that
160. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
161. Id. at 434.
162. Id. at 447. The Court was careful to point out that it had applied the rule to civil
proceedings for forfeiture of an article used in the commission of a crime. One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). The Court distinguished this case, however, by
characterizing the proceedings there as "quasicriminal." Id. at 446 n.17.
163. 428 U.S. at 445-46.
164. Id. at 448.
165. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
166. 428 U.S. at 448-49. The Court here recalled the scathing argument presented by Chief
Justice Burger in his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971). Id.; see notes 115-29 supra and accompanying text.
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such costs had been great. At the same time it took notice of the attempts to
empirically gauge the deterrent effect of the rule and found that they were
flawed because of the many variables involved. 167 Regardless of the effective-
ness of the rule as a deterrent, the Court felt that the marginal value of
extending the rule to the intersovereign 168 use of illegally seized evidence in
federal civil proceedings was certainly outweighed by the injuries to societal
interests. 169
The Janis decision is a mixture of broad analysis and narrow holding.
Insofar as it concerns federal civil proceedings, it is important for what it
says. In the broader perspective of the law of evidence, however, it is
important for what it almost says. The decision stops short of upsetting the
basic holdings of a decade and a half ago. However, there can be no doubt
that the Janis Court saw its role much differently than had the Court that
gave birth to so many extensions of the rule of exclusion. This difference was
expressed most dramatically in the conclusion of Justice Blackmun's analysis:
In the past this Court has opted for exclusion in the anticipation that law enforcement
officers would be deterred from violating Fourth Amendment rights. Then, as now,
the Court acted in the absence of convincing empirical evidence and relied, instead, on
its own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various compo-
nents of the law enforcement system .... There comes a point [, however,] at which
courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create
barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the
duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches. 170
2. Federal Habeas Corpus Relief:
Stone v. Powell
In Stone v. Powell, 17 1 the Supreme Court considered the exclusionary rule
in yet another setting-federal habeas corpus proceedings. In Stone the
respondents had been convicted in state court upon evidence seized by state
officials. After unsuccessfully pursuing their fourth amendment arguments in
the state courts, at trial and upon direct review, they then sought to invoke
their claim again in a federal habeas corpus setting. The approach of Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, was strikingly similar to that of Justice
Blackmun in United States v. Janis.172 He stated that the determination of
whether to allow such a claim to reach federal review would be found "by
167. 428 U.S. at 449-51.
168. The Court was careful to note that it was not deciding the propriety of the use of
evidence illegally seized by federal agents in a federal proceeding. The respondent was thus free
on remand to prove that there was federal participation in the seizure. Id. at 455 n.31.
169. Id. at 454. The Court inJanis did not ignore the issue of judicial integrity; rather, It held
that the concept was not controlling. Cf. Alderman v United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)
(defendant must have standing to make a motion to suppress); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443
(1965) (defendant must have objected to introduction in a timely fashion).
170. 428 U.S. at 459.
171. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
172. 428 U.S. 433 (1976); see notes 160-71 supra and accompanying text.
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weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to
collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims. 1 7 3
In seeking an appropriate balance, Justice Powell reviewed the history of
the exclusionary rule. He recognized the primacy of deterrence as a purpose of
the rule,17 4 but perceived the imperative of judicial integrity as having limited
force in justifying the exclusion of highly probative evidence. 175 While
admitting the value of the rule at trial, despite what he recognized as an
absence of supporting empirical evidence, Justice Powell sharply outlined the
costs of the rule. Those costs included: (1) the undesirable diversion of
attention from the ultimate issue of innocence or guilt, (2) the exclusion of
typically reliable and probative evidence from the fact finding process, and (3)
the occasional freeing of the guilty.17 6 What is more, the costs persist "when a
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collateral review on the
ground that a search-and-seizure claim was erroneously rejected by two or
more tiers of state courts." 1 7 7
The Court maintained that while the consideration of deterrence might
support the exclusionary rule at the trial level, the additional benefits derived
from extending the rule to the claims of state prisoners on collateral review
would be marginal at best and thus "small in relation to the costs.11 7 8
Accordingly, the Court held that "where the State has provided an opportun-
ity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution
does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure
was introduced at his trial."' 179
The decision in Stone elicited a sharp dissent from Justice William Bren-
nan, who viewed the case as dealing with "the availability of afederalfonum
for vindicating . . . federally guaranteed rights."18 0 Justice Brennan argued
173. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 489 (1976).
174. Id. at 492 & n.32. Once again the admission of the deterrent effect of the rule at the trial
level is a grudging one.
175. Id. at 485. The Court again turned to Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)
(requiring standing to object), and Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (requiring timely
objection), as illustrative of situations where the admission of illegally seized evidence was
allowed over considerations of judicial integrity.
176. 428 U.S. at 489-91.
177. Id. at 491 (footnote omitted).
178. Id. at 493.
179. Id. at 482 (footnote omitted). This decision is contrary to the Court's prior holding in
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), which had allowed relief under similar
circumstances in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
The Burger Court had long seemed prepared to take this course. The Stone decision was
foreshadowed three years earlier by Justice Powell's opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
In Schneckloth and similar cases, the majority regularly accepted jurisdiction over collateral
attacks by state prisoners on fourth amendment grounds. Relief, however, was denied upon
finding the searches and seizures involved to be constitutional. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
180. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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that as long as the exclusionary rule of Mapp remained undisturbed, state
courts were required by it to exclude illegally seized evidence. If they failed to
do so, a constitutional error had been committed and federal habeas corpus
relief should be available to review the error. 181
Brennan's dissent was critical of the majority's lack of attention to the
specific language of the habeas corpus statute18 2 and its disregard of prior case
law, which had established a broad ambit of habeas corpus review power. 183
Moreover, Brennan felt that questions of unlawful search and seizure had
been firmly established within that ambit. 8 4 Viewed from this perspective,
Justice Brennan contended, the Court's novel use of the "interest balancing"
approach is untenable. He stated that he could
only view the constitutional garb in which the Court dresses its result as a disguise
for rejection of the longstanding principle that there are no 'second class' constitutional
rights for purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction; it is nothing less than an attempt to
provide a veneer of respectability for an obvious usurpation of Congress' Art. III
power to delineate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' 85
To some extent, the disagreement between Justices Powell and Brennan
reflects fundamental differences in the judicial outlook of the Burger and
Warren Courts. Stone reveals two of these differences, one of which concerns
the proper role of the exclusionary rule. Justice Powell recalled the language
of Calandra, which had characterized the rule as a judicially created remedy
rather than a personal constitutional right.18 6 Acceptance of this premise, left
Powell free to look upon those cases which had included fourth amendment
claims in habeas proceedings as representing a "view" that was "unjustified"
in light of the nature and purpose of the fourth amendment.18 7 Justice
Brennan, on the other hand, did not accept this reading of the nature of the
exclusionary rule. 188 Throughout Stone he spoke of constitutional "rights" or
"guarantees." For Brennan the Court's decision was not a refusal to extend
181. Id. at 509-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "In short, it escapes me as to what logic can
support the assertion that the defendant's unconstitutional confinement obtains during the process
of direct review, no matter how long that process takes, but that the unconstitutionality then
suddenly dissipates . . . in a collateral attack on the conviction." Id. at 509-10 (footnote omitted).
182. Id. at 503-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 519-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), which were essential to Justice Brennan's analysis.
184. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969). There are also several recent cases
in which the Court accepted jurisdiction over the fourth anendment collateral attacks by state
prisoners. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). But see
note 179 supra and accompanying text.
185. 428 U.S. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 486.
187. Id. at 481.
188. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 550-62 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-67 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the exclusionary rule, but rather it was a retreat of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction. 18 9
The second difference discernible in Stone is the Burger Court's attitude
toward the judicial systems of the states. Justice Powell noted that there had
been a change in view: "Despite differences in institutional environment and
the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a
general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and
appellate courts of the several States."190 Thus, while much of the debate in
Stone concentrated on the narrow issues surrounding federal habeas corpus
relief, a more fundamental rift can be seen.
3. Fixed Checkpoint Border Searches: -
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,191 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a particular type of fixed checkpoint border search. This
type of search required that all automobiles passing through the checkpoint
slow down to a virtual halt so that a brief visual inspection could be
conducted. Those automobiles that the Border Patrol officers deemed deserv-
ing of further attention were directed to a secondary inspection area. There
the car's occupants were subjected to a credentials check and brief question-
ing. The average length of stay in such areas was about three to five
minutes. The referral to the secondary questioning area was usually made
without any "articulable suspicion" and was often based upon the Mexican
ancestry of the automobile's occupants. Some of these checkpoints had
operated under a magistrate's warrant; others had not. 192
189. Justice Brennan referred to the Court's decision as a "harbinger of future eviscerations of
the habeas statutes that plainly does violence to congressional power to frame the statutory
contours of habeas jursidiction." 428 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In
reaching this conclusion, he expressed his concern with the majority's analysis, which had termed
fourth amendment claims as "different in kind" from other constitutional transgressions in that
they "do not 'impugn the integrity of the fact-finding process'." Id. For Brennan, such logic
meant a possible withdrawal of federal jurisdiction for other types of constitutional claims
including self-incrimination, entrapment, double jeopardy, and Miranda violations. Id. at 517.
It is important to note that Justice Powell was careful to deny such an extension of Stone:
"With all respect, the hyperbole of the dissenting opinion is misdirected. Our decision today is not
concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional
claims generally. We do reaffirm that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather
than a personal constitutional right ... and we emphasize the minimal utility of the rule when
sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas corpus proceeding. . . Our
decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over such a claim, but only that
the application of the rule is limited to cases in which there has been both such a showing and a
Fourth Amendment violation." Id. at 495 n.37 (emphasis in original).
190. Id. at 494 n.35; cf. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
191. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
192. The complete facts are set out in 428 U.S. at 545-49.
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The Court held that these border checkpoint procedures were
constitutional-even in the absence of a warrant. 193 In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court used a balancing test amd weighed the interest of the
individual in his right to privacy against the public interest in controlling the
influx of illegal aliens.' 94 The Court compared the intrusive elements of fixed
checkpoint searches with those of roving patrols which had previously been
held to be improper.' 95 The wide discretion afforded officers in the roving
patrol situation provided considerable opportunity for abuse and represented
a "potentially unlimited interference with [the residents] use of the high-
ways. 1 96 The fixed checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, on the other hand, was
seen by the majority as less intrusive than the roving patrol. In the former
situation motorists were not taken by surprise and there was less discretion
vested in the officers. 197
Once again the Court refused to extend the rule of exclusion. The
Martinez-Fuerte decision serves to illustrate the application of the balancing
of interests analysis to a narrow search and seizure setting. 198
4. Automobile Inventory Searches:
South Dakota v. Opperman
In December 1973 an automobile that was illegally parked in Vermillion,
South Dakota, was towed away and impounded. While the car was in
custody, items of personal property inside the car were observed by officers,
who then made an inventory of the car's contents in accordance with standard
police procedures.' 99 A plastic bag containing an amount of marijuana was
discovered in the car's unlocked glove compartment. Donald Opperman, the
owner of the car, was arrested and subsequently convicted of possession of
marijuana. This conviction was overturned by the South Dakota Supreme
Court on the ground that the evidence had been seized in violation of the
fourth amendment. 20 0 Thereafter the United States Supreme Court reversed
193. Id. at 566.
194. The Court has previously balanced fourth amendment interests with the public interest,
See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
195. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
196. 428 U.S. at 559 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975)).
197. 428 U.S. at 558-60. Justice Brennan's dissent attacked the notion that referrals to the
secondary questioning area were often made on the basis of the occupant's ancestry. Such a
procedure unfairly subjected a particular group to the upsetting delay and humiliation of
detention and interrogation. Id. at 571-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This reading of the facts,
however, seemed to the majority to "over-state the consequences." Selective referrals were viewed
as advancing fourth amendment interests by minimizing the routine intrusion on the general
motoring public. 428 U.S. at 559-61.
198. The Court also dealt with the need for "individualized suspicion" and its effect upon the
propriety of the checkpoint procedures and the warrant requirement. See 428 U.S. at 563-565.
199. When asked at trial why the inventory was made, the officer replied, "[m]alnly for
safekeeping, because we have had a lot of trouble in the past of [sic] people getting into the
impound lot and breaking into cars and stealing stuff out of them." South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 366 n.1 (1976).
200, State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975).
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and upheld the constitutionality of the police inventory procedure in South
Dakota v. Opperman.20 1
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Burger was quick to note the
distinction that the Court had drawn in earlier cases between automobiles and
homes or offices. 202 He recognized that cars are often taken into custody by
police in the exercise of their "everyday caretaking functions.1 20 3 Once in
custody, the impounded automobile is generally the object of a routine
inventory which he saw as designed to meet "three distinct needs": (1) the
protection of the owner's property while such property is in the hands of the
police, (2) the protection of the police against claims alleging lost or stolen
property, and (3) the protection of the police from potential danger. 2°4 The
Court observed that these caretaking procedures had gained widespread
acceptance in both state courts and lower federal tribunals20 s and predicated
this acceptance upon the courts' application of the fourth amendment stan-
dard of "reasonableness." This application of reasonableness, moreover, did
not include the question of probable cause since such a standard related to
criminal investigations, not to routine administrative caretaking functions. 20 6
While noting that the Supreme Court had not yet reviewed the routine
inventory question directly, Chief Justice Burger stated that prior holdings
permitting automobile searches intended to protect property lent support to
the state and federal decisions. 20 7 In approaching the case at bar, the Chief
Justice rejected a per se treatment of the reasonableness question and affirmed
his faith in a case-by-case examination of the facts and circumstances. 20 8
Since the owner in Opperman was not available to make other arrangements
for the security of his property, and since there was no evidence that the
seizure was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive, the Court
concluded that the procedure was not unreasonable under the fourth
amendment. 209
201. 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976).
202. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
203. 428 U.S. at 369-70 n.4 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).
204. 428 U.S. at 369. The Court also observed that an inventory may be conducted in order
to determine whether the vehicle has been stolen and later abandoned. Id.
205. Id. at 369-71.
206. Id. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that in a setting that did not require probable cause,
the warrant requirement loses its force since the policy underlying the warrant requirement
(probable cause) is inapplicable. Id.
207. Id. at 373-76. The Court relied upon three prior cases in particular for support: Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (upholding an inventory search of the rented car of a Chicago
policeman arrested for drunk driving on the basis that the inspecting officers were searching for
the defendant's service revolver); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (upholding the
introduction of an incriminating registration card found lying on the metal stripping of a car door
since the intrusion was made to protect the car while in custody); and Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967) (upholding the inventory search of an automobile impounded pursuant to a state
forfeiture statute).
208. 428 U.S. at 375. In doing so Chief Justice Burger adopted former Justice Black's
approach to the reasonableness question. He cited Black's opinions in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). 428 U.S. at 372-73.
209. 428 U.S. at 373-77. Justice Powell concurred in an opinion that employed a balancing
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The four cases discussed above represent the Supreme Court's most recent
treatment of the basic questions surrounding the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule. A majority of the Court views these decisions as a well-reasoned
case-by-case analysis of the efficacy of the rule in various search and seizure
situations. 210 An alarmed minority of Warren Court holdovers has, on the
other hand, interpreted the decisions as representing the Burger Court's "slow
strangulation" of the fourth amendment doctrine. 2 1
III. THE FUTURE OF THE RULE
A. Supreme Court Options
The Burger Court has done its best to limit the exclusionary rule by
refusing to extend the doctrine to various factual circumstances or judicial
forums. Moreover, the acceptance of the rule in criminal trials has become
more tentative as a result of the continuing lack of empirical evidence
testifying to the value of the rule and the current emphasis on societal
interests and the "good faith" of police officials which has done much to
diminish the force of the Warren Court's dual rationale of deterrence and
judicial integrity. Given this erosion of support for the exclusionary rule, one
may rightly wonder where its future lies. For now that answer rests with the
Burger Court and the direction it will choose to take. The following discus-
sion examines several options open to the Court.
1. Continued Attrition
The Supreme Court has yet to mount a frontal attack on the exclusionary
rule. Rather, it has waged a war of attrition. Several notions lie at the base of
this posture. One such notion is the Court's respect for the guarantees of the
fourth amendment. Members of the Burger Court majority have continually
recognized the need for some form of protection of fourth amendment
rights. 21 2 Accordingly, the Court has been reluctant to abandon the only
ostensibly effective deterrent to improper police conduct. The Court has also
affirmed its faith in a case-by-case analysis of fourth amendment questions.
21 3
test to determine the reasonableness of the procedure. Id. at 376 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart and White, also used a balancing test. Id. at 384
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The interests balanced in the dissent were the government's interest in
securing the contents of the automobile and the car owner's fourth amendment interests In the
right of privacy. The dissenters felt that the governmental interest did not permit the kind of
routine intrusion exemplified in this case. Id. The Marshall dissent also assailed the majority
opinion as contrary to the law of consent, because there was no procedure for contacting the
owner of the impounded vehicle before the inventory was conducted. Id. at 392-96.
210. Since their appointments, Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist have
found themselves voting against the exclusionary rule in every borderline search and seizure case.
This nucleus was joined by Justice Stevens upon his appointment to the Court in 1975. The five
Nixon-Ford appointees are most often joined by Mr. Justice White in their assault on the rule.
See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
211. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 415-16 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
213. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976).
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This faith has required heavy reliance upon the use of a "balancing test" in
order to adjudicate the interests involved. Unless the Court becomes ex-
tremely disenchanted with the lack of progress of state and federal legislatures
in developing effective alternatives to the rule, a continuation of a progressive
case-by-case evisceration of the rule can be expected. 21 4
2. Overruling Mapp v. Ohio
In his concurring opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,215 Justice Harlan
called for the overruling of Mapp. For Harlan, the Mapp doctrine had been at
the heart of the Court's confusion in the area of search and seizure. The
doctrine had deprived the criminal justice system of the opportunity to
observe and evaluate the varied approaches to the search and seizure problem
that the individual states might have developed. 2 16 Although this rationale
may have held some appeal, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun did
not join Justice Harlan in his call. 21 7 They instead adopted a narrower line of
analysis, and despite their apparent disaffection with the exclusionary rule,
the Burger Court has yet to adopt Harlan's position. Always choosing the
narrower path, the Court has consistently attacked the rule only at its
periphery.
Acceptance of the rule of exclusion at the trial level has been persistent, but
reluctant. The Court has often noted that empirical evidence of the deterrent
value of the rule is lacking. 218 At the same time it has effectively discounted
the "imperative of judicial integrity" as a controlling factor in search and
seizure cases.
2 19
When Mapp overruled Wolf in 1961, one of the justifications offered was
that the factual considerations which had supported Wolf could not then be
214. The Court has made no attempt to overrule the Mopp doctrine during its present term.
Its only major search and seizure decision of the term reflects the case-by-case approach. In
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977), the Court held that suppression of evidence was
not a proper remedy in a case where the Government had failed to name certain defendants in its
application for a wiretap warrant.
Despite this recent treatment, the disaffection of the Court with legislative inaction is still
evident. In his concurring opinion in Stone v. Powell, Chief Justice Burger stated- "it can no
longer be assumed that other branches of government will act while judges cling to this
Draconian, discredited device in its present absolutist form." 428 U.S. at 500 (Burger. C.J.,
concurring).
215. 403 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
216. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 492 (Burger, C.J., concurring), at 510 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
218. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 446 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
219. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454
(1976). In support of this conclusion, the Court pointed to the several cases in which notions of
judicial integrity did not preclude the admissibility of illegally seized evidence. See notes 170 &
176 supra and accompanying text. "The teaching of [such] cases is clear. While courts, of course,
must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has
limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence." Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. at 485.
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deemed controlling. 220 The continuing assault upon, and the resultant
weakening of, the dual rationale of deterrence and judicial integrity has now
placed the Mapp decision in a position which is vulnerable to a similar attack.
The Burger Court, upon careful reconsideration might well conclude that the
factual considerations underlying Mapp are no longer controlling and that its
reversal is in order. This is particularly likely in light of the Court's recent use
of balancing tests. The ultimate balancing of interests would weigh the
dubious deterrent value of the rule of exclusion against the rule's great costs to
society. Faced with such a choice, it is possible that the Court would find
itself in favor of allowing states to develop their own approaches. 221
3. Development of a "Good Faith" Test
While a direct overruling of Mapp seems to have some doctrinal support in
the decisions of the Burger Court, the conservative nature of the Court
suggests that a full-scale overturning of the decision is unlikely. It would be
more consistent for the Court to adopt a middle ground just short of this
drastic result. A logical middle ground might look to the development of a
good faith test for the exclusion of improperly seized evidence.
In United States v. Peltier, 222 when Justice Rehnquist examined the issue of
judicial integrity, he focused upon the good faith of the officer. He reasoned
that if the officer's conduct resulted from the good faith belief that he was
acting properly and within the law, the notion of judicial integrity would not
be offended. 223 The Court has also noted that "[w]here the official action was
pursued in complete good faith . . . the deterrence rationale loses much of its
force." 224 Consequently, if the Court is unwilling to relieve illegally seized
evidence from the weight of Mapp, it could well move to exempt evidence
produced through good faith efforts by the police.
The narrowing of the exclusionary rule to circumstances involving bad faith
already has the support of both the Chief Justice, 225 and Justice White. In his
dissent in Stone v. Powell, Justice White expressed the view that Weeks and
Mapp had overshot their marks in deterring illegal police action and had,
instead, created "a senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth in many criminal
trials.1 226 While he would not expressly overrule Weeks and Mapp, Justice
220. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961); see notes 61-67 supra and accompanying text.
221. Once again the question of the development of effective alternatives by the states and the
Court's unwillingness to abandon the rule until such alternatives have been developed persists.
See notes 215-217 supra and accompanying text. However, Chief Justice Burger recently
observed: "I venture to predict that overruling this judicially contrived doctrine--or limiting Its
scope to egregious, bad-faith conduct-would inspire a surge of activity toward providing some
kind of statutory remedy for persons injured by police mistake or misconduct." Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
222. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
223. Id. at 537-38.
224. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
225. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
226. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
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White did indicate that the exclusionary rule should be "substantially mod-
ified so as to prevent its application in those many circumstances where the
evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting ia the good-faith belief that
his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for
this belief.1227 The views of these two members of the Court, together with
the doctrinal framework already erected in Peltier, could easily blend to give
root to the development of a good faith test.
4. Independent State Grounds
One commentator has suggested that if a state were to adopt its own
narrower definition of exclusion, the Supreme Court could effectively disarm
its own exclusionary rule by recognizing an independent state ground and
refusing to grant certiorari. 228 This theory is thought to be supported by the
California case of People v. Krivda.229 In Krivda, the defendant's garbage
was searched without a warrant, and evidence of that search was therefore
suppressed at trial. When the Supreme Court of California ultimately agreed
with that suppression, 230 the California Attorney General appealed the deci-
sion to the United States Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion, the Court
refused to deal with the fourth amendment question. Rather, it remanded the
case to the California Supreme Court to determine whether the California
decision had been based upon fourth and fourteenth amendment considera-
tions as interpreted by Mapp, or upon the equivalent provision of the
California constitution, or both. 2
31
The California court, sitting en banc, replied in a memorandum opinion
that it had "relied upon both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and art. I section 19 of the California Constitution, and that
accordingly the latter provision furnished an independent ground to support
the result . . . reached in that opinion."2 32 The California Attorney General
again pressed his appeal and questioned whether the California determination
was sufficiently independent since it dealt with an area arguably dependent
upon the interpretation of a corresponding federal constitutional provision.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to take up the question and denied
certiorari. 233
It should be noted here that the Supreme Court's apparent recognition of an
independent state ground was made upon examination of a state constitu-
tional provision that was at least as strict as its federal counterpart. It would,
227. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
228. Note, The Impending Limitation of the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule-Will the
Supreme Court Vandalize the Constitution?, 5 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 91, 93 (1973).
229. 12 Cal. App. 3d 963, 91 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1970), aff'd, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96
Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971) (en banc), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 1039, vacated and remanded for
clarification sub. nom. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972) (per curiam), aff'd on rehearing, 8
Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (per curia}n), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
230. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
231. 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
232. 8 Cal. 3d 623, 624, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973).
233. 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
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however, be too much of an analytical leap to apply such reasoning to a state
statute which adopts a narrower reading of constitutional requirements than
those of Mapp and its progeny. Reliance by the Court on the doctrine of
independent state grounds *ould represent a "back-door" approach that
would effectively overrule Mapp without coming to grips with it. Despite the
Burger Court's encouragement of state innovation in its use of the indepen-
dent state ground doctriae, such a posture would seem highly unlikely.
5. Alternative Remedies
The history of the Burger Court's view of the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule is one marked by mere acquiescence-a lesser of two evils approach.
This posture suggests that the development of some effective alternative to the
rule by federal or state legislatures would be a welcomed event that would set
the stage for abolition of the judicially created exclusionary doctrine. Cer-
tainly the most vocal proponent of such legislative action has been Chief
Justice Burger who has often suggested approaches. 234
When Justice Clark in Mapp called for a reconsideration of the exclusionary
rule in state cases, he relied strongly on the fact that alternative remedies had
proved "worthless and futile. '235 At first blush, such an observation would
seem to stand in the way of supplanting a judicially created rule of exclusion.
It must be remembered, however, that the failure of alternatives noted in
Mapp was a failure of civil and criminal remedies in their traditional form. At
the time of Mapp little was being done to develop new approaches. 236 Thus,
California's law in this area at the time of its highly regarded swing to the
exclusionary rule was described as being in "a vague and ill-defined state. '237
Given this situation, it was not surprising that the Court turned to the only
remedy within its command to enforce the fourth amendment-the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence at trial.
Several possible alternatives to the exclusionary rule are discussed below.
234. Chief Justice Burger's suggestions date back almost to the Mapp decision itself. In 1962,
as a member of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, he suggested that the
federal district courts send copies of trial transcripts to local executive authorities in each case In
which evidence had been suppressed so that the actions of the police might be reviewed, Killough
v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 257 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J., dissenting). In 1964 he called
for an "independent review body" to handle complaints. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watch-
man?, 14 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1964). As a member of the Supreme Court, Burger outlined a
legislative plan that would allow for greater latitude in the Federal Tort Claims Act. Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcoticus, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); see notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
235. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961); see note 66 supra and accompanying text.
236. There was a dearth of ambitious enforcement through alternative means even in the
traditional sense. At the time of Mapp fewer than 23 states imposed punitive sanctions to official
misconduct. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 n.7 (1961). At the time of the Wolf decision In 1949
only three states had provided civil relief by statute. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n. 1
(1949).
237. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People vs.
Cahan, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 565, 569 (1955).
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a. Civil Tort Remedies
A civil action for trespass arising out of unlawful searches and seizures has
been recognized in the English common law238 and in some state legisla-
tion. 239 Indeed, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action against police
officers arising from the fourth amendment. 240 This tort law approach to the
problem of unlawful searches and seizures has been universally recognized,
however, as an ineffective deterrent.2 t Several basic flaws have been pointed
out:242 (1) damages are too small to encourage suit-actual damages must be
proven and punitive damages would only be available upon a difficult
showing of malice or ill will; (2) sovereign immunity often blocks suit against
agencies of the government; 243 (3) the plaintiff is often placed in a question-
able moral light because of the fact that he was a target of official inquiry-
plaintiffs may be subject to attacks on their character and reputation in an
effort by defendants to mitigate damages; and (4) collection of the judgement
may be difficult where the damages are great and the resources of the
defendant policeman are not.
These obstacles have served only to discourage suits. As a result, the threat
of civil action has had little deterrent effect on the actions of police officers.
To meet this problem, commentators have recommended a number of
changes. Among these changes are: (1) governmental liability for the trans-
gressions of officers errant in the performance of their duties,244 (2) a
provision for minimum liquidated damages, s5 and, (3) a restriction of the
clean hands defense in such actions.2 4 6 It has also been suggested that police
officers should be bonded against actions arising out of good faith transgres-
sions.247 It is interesting to note that many of these elements were included in
238. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765); Wilkes
v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
239. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n.1 (1949).
240. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
241. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
445, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955) (en banc); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Foote].
242. See generally Foote, supra note 241, at 498-504; Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law,
24 Cornell L.Q. 337, 386 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Plumb]; Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An
Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. Legal Stud. 243, 272 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Spiotto]; Wingo, Growing Disillusionment With the Exclusionary Rule, 25
Sw. L.J. 573, 579-82 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Wingo].
243. Cf. White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951) (en banc) (immunity from civil
action extended even to a Fish and Game Commission in an action for malicious prosecution).
This decision was considered instrumental in California's ultimate embracing of an exclusionary
rule.
244. Foote, supra note 241, at 514; Plumb, supra note 242, at 387; Wingo, supra note 242, at
581-82.
245. Foote, supra note 241, at 514.
246. Id.
247. Plumb, supra note 242, at 387.
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Chief Justice Burger's legislative proposal in his dissent in Bivens. 24 8 Such
reforms, however, have not yet been aggressively pursued by state or federal
legislatures.
b. Criminal or Departmental Sanctions
Currently, officers violating the fourth amendment may be prosecuted
before the criminal bar. Such actions, however, are extremely rare.249 It has
been widely recognized that prosecutors are slow to bring criminal proceed-
ings against members of the police force for actions taken by them during the
performance of their duties. 250 At the same time, police authorities are slow to
bring departmental charges in cases of fourth amendment violations, often
because the exclusionary rule is considered to be both the deterrent and the
punishment for such violations. 251 Thus, only the most egregious violations
receive serious consideration, and even in these the fact finding process
presents many difficulties not present in normal investigations. 25 2
Suggested alternatives to departmental regulation often include some sort of
civilian or police/civilian review board to handle citizen complaints.2 3 It has
also been proposed that criminal sanctions be made available without relying
upon a prosecutor for initiation. Under one such scheme, a contempt proceed-
ing could be initiated upon the affidavit of the victim. Fines could then be
imposed, with forfeiture of office the penalty for habitual violations.
254
c. Modifications of the Rule
If the exclusionary rule is not to be totally supplanted by an alternative,
some have suggested that it can be narrowed so as to maintain its deterrent
effect while avoiding its more adverse consequences. Three such major
modifications have been put forward. The first is that the rule should not be
applied when the officer in question has acted under the good faith belief that
his actions were in conformity with constitutional norms or when his trans-
gressions were merely inadvertent. 25 s A second would not apply the rule in
248. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see note 120 supra and accompanying text.
249. Foote, supra note 241, at 493-94; Plumb, supra note 242, at 388.
250. Foote, supra note 241, at 493; Plumb, supra note 242, at 388; Schwartz, Complaints
Against Police: Experience of the Community Rights Division of the Philadelphia District
Attorney's Office, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1023, 1024-27 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Schwartz]; Wingo,
supra note 242, at 580.
251. Spiotto, supra note 242, at 273.
252. Schwartz, supra note 250, at 1027-31. Such practical difficulties include: (1) tbN neutral-
ity, or lack thereof, of investigating officers, (2) the heavy burden of proof thrust upon the
complainant, (3) hostile treatment of witnesses friendly to the complainant, and (4) restricted
access to police witnesses. Id.
253. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 76, at 16-20; Roche, A Viable Substitute for the Exclusio-
nary Rule: A Civil Rights Appeal Board, 30 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 223 (1973); Wingo, supra note
242, at 581.
254. Plumb, supra note 242, at 388-89.
255. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Kaplan, The Limits of
the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stanford L. Rev. 1027, 1044-45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan).
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cases where the crime was serious (e.g., murder, rape, etc.),. S 6 Even within
this serious crime exception, however, egregious police conduct would still
result in the exclusion of resultant evidence. A third suggestion would hold
the exclusionary rule inapplicable where the police department in question has
taken seriously its responsibility to adhere to fourth amendment require-
ments.2S7 The measure of commitment would be the use of training programs
and standard operating procedures that are consistent with the fourth
amendment.
All of the alternatives outlined above are aimed at avoiding the costs to
society that the exclusionary rule entails. Experiments have appeared from
time to time, but a comprehensive program of reform has yet to emerge
anywhere.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to examine the application of the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule without being haunted by vague feelings of discontent. This vague
discontent turns to increasing uneasiness as one considers the futility of the
logic behind the doctrine. Dean Wigmore recognized this futility and, shortly
after the Weeks decision, offered the following scenario:
Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery;, Flavius, you have
confessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime,
and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish
Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way of
teaching people like Titus to behave and incidently of securing respect for the
Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who
breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else.2 ss
When first enunciated, Wigmore's argument was faced with formidable
evidence supporting the suppression doctrine. The rudimentary nature of
police techniques with its attendant lack of care for constitutional rights
caused deep concern among civil libertarians. The reticence of legislators in
developing effective programs turned this deep concern into judicial action.
First on the federal level and then in the states, the judicial approach served
to change many standard police procedures. Faced with the development of
more responsible police procedures, courts now consider a nagging question:
Has the rule of exclusion outlived its usefulness?
During the last several years, the Burger Court has sought to bring reason
to the enforcement of the fourth amendment. Its case-by-case analysis has
deftly sought to avoid the worst of the suppression doctrine. Such an
approach, however, raises questions of its own. Can a case-by-case determi-
nation of fourth amendment questions establish clear guideposts for police
conduct in the field? It is interesting to note that some members of the Court,
256. Kaplan, supra note 255, at 1046-49.
257. Id. at 1050-55.




once critical of requiring the ordinary policeman to deal with the subtle
nuances of appellate decisions, have supported the establishment of a new set
of subtleties.
Although reasonable inroads have been made, the exclusionary rule still
stands as the only substantial vehicle for the enforcement of the fourth
amendment. In that role, it is woefully inadequate. Its force is derived solely
from its questionable deterrent value. It is not compensatory in nature and
was never meant to be. 259 The result is a doctrine that leaves the innocent
victim of unlawful police conduct without an effective remedy. Moreover,
misguided reliance upon the rule serves to discourage the development of
truly effective alternatives.
We have reached the point of diminishing returns. The persistent costs to
society of the rule serve as a daily reminder of this fact. The fourth
amendment exclusionary rule as we know it today must be dismantled.
Ideally, legislatures will move to develop programs that will yield more
effective enforcement of constitutional guarantees. The establishment of sen-
sible tort remedies presents itself as the most logical legislative choice. Chief
Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens provides the blueprint for such a plan.
260
Law and order advocates and civil libertarians alike would applaud a
program that demands a full accounting from both the criminal defendant
and the errant policeman. Such legislative action must also receive the
support of a judiciary willing to turn away from a doctrine of its own creation
in favor of an effective alternative developed by representatives of the
people. 26 1
In the absence of legislative initiative, the Supreme Court must act. 262 The
Court must pursue its quest for reason by adopting a bold new approach. Any
one of three approaches would go far to remedy the current state of affairs.
The most modest of these approaches would apply the rule of exclusion only
in those cases involving bad faith violations of the fourth amendment. 263
Good faith, technical transgressions would not be fatal to resulting evidence.
A second, less moderate approach, would save evidentiary exclusion for cases
involving egregious or conspiratorial violations of fourth amendment rights.
For less serious bad faith violations, the errant officer would face citation for
contempt. The evidence, however, would survive. The most daring alterna-
259. "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
217 (1960).
260. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see note 120 supra and accompanying text.
261. It should be emphasized that state legislatures need not wait for congressional Initia-
tives. State enactments could be recognized and given full force by state and federal courts as
long as the protection afforded is adequate.
262. It is interesting to note that a conservative Court is left to act in the absence of legislative
initiative. Chief Justice Burger has often spoken out strongly against judicial "legislation." See,
e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(Burger, C. J., dissenting); Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(Burger, J., dissenting); note 96 supra.
263. See notes 222-227 supra and accompanying text.
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tive would overrule Mapp v. Ohio.264 While some form of good faith test
would be reserved for the federal forum, the states would be free to develop
their own approaches. Such a decision would force the issue in many state
legislatures.
Regardless of the option chosen, the Court should act decisively at its next
available opportunity. We have lived too long with the inadequacies of an
archaic judicial approach to the problem of unlawful searches and seizures.
American police techniques have matured enormously since 1914 when the
rule was first announced. The method of enforcing the fourth amendment,
however, has not experienced a similar maturity. Dean Wigmore once pre-
dicted: "Some day, no doubt, we shall emerge from this quaint method of
enforcing the law." 265 That day is overdue.
Normnan M. Robertson
264. 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see notes 215-21 supra and accompanying text.
265. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479, 484
(1922).
